Automaticity and control in prospective memory: a computational model. by Gilbert, SJ et al.
Automaticity and Control in Prospective Memory: A
Computational Model
Sam J. Gilbert*, Nicola Hadjipavlou, Matthieu Raoelison
Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom
Abstract
Prospective memory (PM) refers to our ability to realize delayed intentions. In event-based PM paradigms, participants must
act on an intention when they detect the occurrence of a pre-established cue. Some theorists propose that in such
paradigms PM responding can only occur when participants deliberately initiate processes for monitoring their
environment for appropriate cues. Others propose that perceptual processing of PM cues can directly trigger PM
responding in the absence of strategic monitoring, at least under some circumstances. In order to address this debate, we
present a computational model implementing the latter account, using a parallel distributed processing (interactive
activation) framework. In this model PM responses can be triggered directly as a result of spreading activation from units
representing perceptual inputs. PM responding can also be promoted by top-down monitoring for PM targets. The model
fits a wide variety of empirical findings from PM paradigms, including the effect of maintaining PM intentions on ongoing
response time and the intention superiority effect. The model also makes novel predictions concerning the effect of
stimulus degradation on PM performance, the shape of response time distributions on ongoing and prospective memory
trials, and the effects of instructing participants to make PM responses instead of ongoing responses or alongside them.
These predictions were confirmed in two empirical experiments. We therefore suggest that PM should be considered to
result from the interplay between bottom-up triggering of PM responses by perceptual input, and top-down monitoring for
appropriate cues. We also show how the model can be extended to simulate encoding new intentions and subsequently
deactivating them, and consider links between the model’s performance and results from neuroimaging.
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Introduction
In standard laboratory paradigms for assessing prospective
memory (PM), participants are engaged in an ongoing task
requiring classification of a series of stimuli. For example, on each
trial the participant might be presented with a pair of letters, one
upper-case and one lower-case, and respond with a left or right
keypress to indicate the location of the upper-case letter [1;2]. In
PM conditions, an additional instruction is introduced, for
instance to press a middle button if the same letter is presented
on both sides (e.g. ‘‘a A’’). In this way PM targets are embedded
within an ongoing task. However, these stimuli do not compel
a PM response; participants could also make a standard ongoing
response (in this case, right key) if they did not classify the stimulus
as a target. In some respects this is similar to real-world situations
in which people hold a delayed intention (e.g. to post a letter),
while performing an ongoing task (e.g. walking down the street,
engaged in conversation). On encountering a target (i.e. mailbox),
one might make an appropriate PM response (post the letter), or
miss the target and continue the ongoing task (walk past the
mailbox).
Within the PM literature, a debate has arisen over the
mechanisms by which PM responses are triggered. According to
some authors [3], detecting a PM target is contingent upon the
engagement of preparatory attentional processes, i.e. resource
demanding processes that lead to appropriate monitoring of the
environment for PM cues. Without such processes, it is argued,
PM cues cannot be detected as such. Consistent with this account,
several studies have shown that response times (RTs) in the
ongoing task to nontargets are slowed when participants hold in
mind a delayed intention [3;4]. This slowing (‘‘PM task in-
terference effect’’) is taken to reflect the withdrawal of resources
from ongoing task performance in order to permit monitoring for
PM targets. Furthermore, at least in some studies, the size of each
participant’s PM interference effect is correlated with the
percentage of PM targets detected, suggesting that the PM
interference effect is functionally related to detection of PM targets
[3]. However, this relationship between the PM interference effect
and PM target detection has not always been observed [5].
Additional evidence that could be taken to support monitoring
theories comes from analyses of RTs on PM miss trials (where an
ongoing response is made to a PM target) versus ongoing trials
(where an ongoing response is made to a PM nontarget). It has
been reported that (erroneous) ongoing responses made to PM
targets have faster RTs than (correct) ongoing responses made to
nontargets [6]. This can be considered an example of an ‘intention
superiority effect’ [7], seeing as responses on trials associated with
a delayed intention are speeded relative to nontarget trials (see [8]
for further discussion). This pattern of results could be caused, at
least in part, by a failure of preparatory monitoring on PM miss
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trials. This could lead to faster RTs than standard ongoing trials,
on which preparatory monitoring will be engaged at least on
a proportion of trials. In support of this hypothesis, West et al. [9]
found that RTs on nontarget ongoing trials preceding a PM miss
were faster than trials preceding a PM hit, suggesting that
a disruption of preparatory monitoring, associated with faster
ongoing RTs, predicted subsequent PM misses.
In contrast with monitoring theories, some authors have
suggested that in certain circumstances PM cue detection can be
triggered relatively automatically by presentation of the appropri-
ate stimulus, in the absence of deliberate preparatory monitoring
[4;10;11;12]. According to these accounts, deliberate target
monitoring can still play a part in prospective remembering, but
it need not be mandatory. For example, according to the
multiprocess framework of McDaniel and Einstein [4;13], some
situations encourage automatic detection of PM targets, whereas
other situations require deliberate monitoring. According to
McDaniel and Einstein [13], ‘‘focal’’ cues, in which the stimulus
attributes defining PM and ongoing responses overlap, can
sometimes lead to automatic PM target detection. By contrast,
‘‘nonfocal’’ cues, where PM targets and ongoing responses are
related to different aspects of stimuli, or even different stimuli, are
proposed to require monitoring. Evidence for multiprocess
accounts comes from studies showing that the size of the PM
interference effect is modulated by the nature of the PM and
ongoing tasks, suggesting that monitoring is required to a greater
or lesser degree depending on the nature of the task [4;14].
Furthermore, in some studies, accurate PM responding has been
reported [11], or PM cues have been noticed [10], in the absence
of a detectable PM interference effect (see also [15;16]).
Here, we attempt to address this debate by presenting
a computational model simulating performance in a PM para-
digm. The model is related to the earlier model of Gilbert and
Shallice [17], which was itself an extension of the model presented
by Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland [18]. Gilbert and Shallice’s
model simulated performance in a task switching paradigm, in
which participants switch rapidly between different tasks on a trial-
by-trial basis. The present model is conceptually related to this
earlier work, seeing as PM paradigms require participants to
switch from an ongoing to a PM response on target trials. Like the
Gilbert and Shallice model, the present model is based on the
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) framework, using the
interactive activation equations introduced by McClelland and
Rumelhart [19]. The model consists of several processing units
(‘‘nodes’’), each with an associated activation value. Activation
spreads between nodes, dependent on the weights of connections
between them. A simulated trial begins with activation being
applied to input units. Processing is then iterated in cycles, with
activity propagating through the network on each cycle, gradually
accruing in units to which the input units are connected. The trial
ends when a threshold is met at the response units, determining
that a particular response has been selected; the number of cycles
taken to reach the response threshold is recorded as the model’s
RT. Behaviour and RT can then be compared against analogous
empirical results.
In the Gilbert and Shallice model, two possible tasks (colour-
naming and word-reading in response to Stroop colour-word
stimuli) were implemented as distinct input-output pathways,
connecting input and output nodes. Empirical phenomena
associated with task switching were simulated as a consequence
of competition between these two pathways. A pair of ‘task
demand’ units implemented top-down control, biasing processing
towards one or the other pathway. On trials where one pathway
was much stronger than the other, the model produced relatively
fast responses. But on trials where the two pathways were more
similar in strength (e.g. immediately after a switch of tasks), RT
was extended as a result of competition between conflicting
responses. The present model implements a similar mechanism.
There are two pathways leading from input to output: one
representing the ongoing task and one representing the PM task
(i.e. detecting PM cues and pressing the PM response button).
These input-output pathways represent relatively automatic
responses triggered directly by perceptual input. In addition,
a ‘monitoring unit’ implements top-down control, by selectively
boosting activation along the PM pathway. Thus, competition
between ongoing and PM responses is modulated by activation of
the monitoring unit. Consistent with the multiprocess framework
[13], PM responding is therefore triggered by a combination of
mechanisms: direct triggering of the PM response by an automatic
stimulus-response link, and top-down monitoring, which assists
this PM stimulus-response link. Crucially, monitoring in the model
is a graded phenomenon: the monitoring unit can be set to
variable levels of activation or to zero, in which case it has no
impact on processing at all. In this respect, the model differs from
the theoretical account put forward by Smith and Bayen [20],
which was implemented in a mathematical model whereby




The task simulated by the model was as described in the
Introduction, and used empirically in the studies of Gilbert et al.
[1] and Okuda et al. [2]. Possible inputs consist of a pair of letters
from the set (A, B, C), with one letter presented in upper-case and
one letter presented in lower-case. The appropriate response is left
if the upper-case letter is on the left, and right if the upper-case
letter is on the right. This constitutes the ongoing task. In addition,
if the same letter is presented on both sides (e.g. ‘‘a A’’), the
appropriate response is to press the middle button rather than the
right button. This constitutes the PM task.
Model Architecture
The architecture of the model is presented in Figure 1. There
are 12 input units, representing each of the six possible stimuli at
each position. For example, the stimulus ‘‘A c’’ would be simulated
by activating the leftmost and rightmost input unit. The three
output units represent Left, Right, and PM responses. The three
input units representing an upper-case letter on the left are
connected with positive connection weights to the Left output unit;
likewise the units representing upper-case letters on the right send
a positive input to the Right output unit. These connections
(labelled 1 in Figure 1) constitute the direct stimulus-response
pathway underlying the ongoing task. The PM input-output
pathway involves an intervening set of ‘target detection’ units; thus
the pathway is constituted by the connections labelled 2 and 3 in
Figure 1. Each of the four input units representing the letter ‘A’ or
‘a’ is connected to the ‘A/a’ target detection unit; likewise for the
units representing B/b and C/c. The three target detection units
are all connected with a positive weight to the PM output unit.
Thus, when a PM target stimulus is presented, both input units will
send activation to the relevant target detection unit, which itself
sends activation to the PM output unit. However, a nontarget
stimulus will send activation to different target detection units, so
no single unit will achieve a high degree of activation. The
monitoring unit sends activation to each of the three target
detection units. This top-down pathway (labelled 4 in Figure 1) is
Prospective Memory
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assumed to represent strategic, deliberate monitoring for PM
targets. Thus activation of target detection units arises from both
direct bottom-up triggering from the stimulus input units, and top-
down modulation from the monitoring unit. Insofar as bottom-up
triggering from the input units is insufficient for PM responding,
top-down input from the monitoring unit is additionally required,
as proposed in the multiprocess framework [13]. In addition to the
connections described above, each of the three output units send
a negative connection to the other two output units; likewise the
three target detection units are connected to each other in a similar
manner. This implements a form of lateral inhibition, whereby
activation in one of the output or target detection units tends to
suppress activation in the other two units. This encourages the
model to converge on activation of a single unit within these
modules.
Operation of the Model
The model parameters were set by hand in order to produce
adequate performance of the task (see Table S1 for values). The
model is therefore potentially open to the criticism that it could
capture any pattern of behaviour and that its parameters have
simply been set so that it reproduces known empirical results,
without providing any theoretical constraints. In order to address
this point, it is important that the model is able to generate novel
predictions that can be tested empirically. Insofar as the model
makes such predictions, and they are empirically validated, this
indicates that the model goes beyond simply reproducing pre-
existing empirical results.
The steps taken to simulate a trial are as follows (essentially
following the procedure used in the model of Gilbert and Shallice
[17]). All units are initialized to an activation level of zero at the
beginning of the trial. A ‘‘cycle’’ then takes place as follows. Two
input units have their activation level set to the input activation
level (to represent the stimulus presented on that trial) and the
monitoring unit is set to the monitoring activation level (to
represent the PM top-down monitoring level for that trial; see
Table S1 for parameter settings). For the remaining units, the net
input is calculated by summing the activation level of every other
unit, multiplied in each case by the relevant connection weight to
the target unit (see Table S1 for connection weights). In addition,
there is a negative bias term added to the net input for each target
detection unit, so that net input to these units will always be
negative unless counteracted by positive activation contributed
from other units. Once the net inputs have all been calculated, the
activation level for each unit is updated as follows:
If the net input is positive : Dact~step|net|(max{act)
If the net input is negative : Dact~step|net|(act{min )
Where act = current activation, step = step size, net = net input,
max=maximum activation value, and min=minimum activation
value. The step size parameter determines the magnitude of the
change in activation on each cycle, setting the speed of processing.
On each cycle, a random noise term is also added to the activation
values of every unit. This term is drawn from a Gaussian
distribution, with a mean of zero; the standard deviation of this
distribution determines how much disruption is caused by noise on
each cycle. After noise has been added the activation levels of any
units outside the maximum and minimum values are reset to the
relevant extreme. At the end of each cycle, the activation level of
the most active output unit is compared against the second most
active output unit. If this difference exceeds a threshold, the
response associated with the most active output unit is declared as
the model’s response on that trial, and the number of cycles since
the beginning of the trial recorded as the RT. Otherwise, the net
inputs are calculated again and a new cycle begins. In this way,
activation gradually propagates through the network until a re-
Figure 1. Model architecture. Only connections between units representing the letter ‘A’ are shown, for simplicity; analogous connections existed
for representations of ‘B’ and ‘C’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059852.g001
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sponse threshold is met. If the response threshold has not been met
after 500 cycles, the trial is ended and an error recorded (without
recording RT).
A fundamental feature of the model is interactive competition
between the PM and ongoing pathways. On a nontarget trial, the
relevant input unit (i.e. the unit representing the upper-case letter)
will send activation to one of the ongoing response units, leading to
a build-up of activation at the output layer. Seeing as nontarget
stimuli do not lead to significant activation of the target detection
units (because the two input units, sending activation to different
target matching units, do not provide sufficient activation to
counteract the negative bias applied to these units), the ongoing
response unit will generally reach the response threshold, rather
than the PM response unit. On a PM target trial, the two pathways
will compete. Activation will be sent from the input units directly
to the relevant ongoing output unit. In addition, activation will be
sent from the input units, via the target matching units, to the PM
response unit. Thus activation will build up in both the PM output
unit and one of the ongoing output units. Due to the lateral
inhibition between these units, the ongoing and PM output units
will tend to inhibit each other. Thus, small differences in the
relative input contributing to the ongoing and PM response units
(including the noise added to the activation levels on each cycle)
will have the effect of tipping the model’s output towards a PM or
ongoing response, in a competitive manner.
Performance of the Model
1. Effect of monitoring level. In order to test performance
of the model, 100,000 simulated trials were run of each of the 12
possible ongoing trials and 200,000 simulations of the six possible
PM target trials, so that equal numbers of target and nontarget
trials were run. This was using the standard parameter settings
detailed in the Appendix. We refer to this as the ‘standard
monitoring’ settings. Due to the large number of trials, all
differences between conditions in the model’s performance were
highly significant (generally p,102100); we therefore omit
significance testing in the results reported below. Two additional
simulations were conducted, identical to the standard monitoring
settings, but with the activation level of the monitoring unit set to 1
and zero. These settings are referred to as the ‘high monitoring’
and ‘no monitoring’ settings respectively. Results from these
simulations are presented in Figure 2.
There are three noteworthy features of Figure 2. First, the
model is able to perform the task adequately. Performance on
nontarget ongoing trials is near ceiling, and the model is able to
detect PM targets on at least a proportion of trials, even when
monitoring is set to zero. Further analysis indicated that on PM
miss trials, the correct ongoing response (e.g. Left rather than
Right for ‘A a’) was produced on over 99% of trials, indicating that
PM misses were associated with otherwise correct performance of
the ongoing task. Second, higher top-down monitoring levels were
associated with an increased proportion of hits on PM target trials.
Third, higher top-down monitoring levels were associated with
increased RT even on nontarget ongoing trials. Thus, the model
simulates the intention maintenance cost, and the relation between
this cost and accuracy of PM target detection, reported by Smith
[3]. These findings are readily accounted for in computational
terms, seeing as the monitoring unit sends direct input to the target
matching units. On PM target trials, this will boost activation
along the PM pathway, making it more likely that the PM output
unit will win competition against the ongoing output unit. On
nontarget trials, this boosting effect will lead to some activation
being sent to the PM output unit, extending the response
competition process between the ongoing and PM output unit
and causing longer RTs.
2. Effects of stimulus degradation. In a second analysis,
we investigated whether any other factors, alongside top-down
monitoring level, could affect the model’s PM target detection
rate. In order to do this, we ran an additional simulation identical
to the standard settings, except that the stimulus input level (i.e.
activation level to which activated stimulus input units are set) was
reduced from 1.0 to 0.9. This stimulates the effect of degraded
stimulus input. We predicted that this manipulation would
generally slow RTs, seeing as the contribution from the input
units to other units in the model would be reduced, so it should
take more cycles for the output units to reach the output threshold.
We also predicted that this manipulation might affect PM target
detection levels. Our reasoning was as follows. The pathway
leading directly from input to output units (commanding ongoing
responses) is direct. But the pathway leading from input to output
units via target detection units (commanding stimulus-evoked PM
responses) is indirect (i.e. involves intervening target detection
units). It is therefore possible that degrading the input representa-
tions will have more effect on the indirect PM pathway (with an
intervening set of units, and therefore an additional locus at which
noise is added) than the direct ongoing pathway, which may be
more robust to noise. As a result, competition between the ongoing
and PM pathways will be biased somewhat towards the ongoing
pathway, as a result of stimulus degradation.
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Figure 3 shows that both of these predictions were substantiated.
Stimulus degradation led to both increased ongoing RTs and
decreased PM target detection. Thus, the model is able to capture
a positive relationship between ongoing RT and PM target
detection under some circumstances (manipulation of top-down
monitoring) and a negative relationship between ongoing RT and
PM target detection under others (degradation of stimulus input).
The model’s simulation of the intention maintenance cost, i.e. the
difference in ongoing RT between no-monitoring and standard-
monitoring settings, was comparable in the standard settings
(mean: 3.1 cycles) and the degraded input settings (mean: 3.4
cycles). The model’s behaviour is therefore compatible with
empirical data showing a positive relationship between the
intention maintenance cost and PM detection in some circum-
stances (e.g. [3]) but not others [5].
3. Intention superiority effect. Inspection of Figure 3
shows that PM miss trials had faster RTs than ongoing trials,
even though the model produces the same (i.e. ongoing) response
for both. The model therefore simulates the intention superiority
effect [6]. How can this be explained? The literature on this effect
posits two potential explanations. The first is that stimuli
associated with an active intention are represented at a higher
level of activation than other types of stimuli [7;21], or in
conjunction with distinctive motoric information [22], leading to
a speeding of RT when that stimulus is encountered. This cannot
explain the model’s simulation of the intention superiority effect,
seeing as PM target stimuli are represented in an identical manner
to other stimuli. PM target stimuli do lead to greater activation in
target matching units than nontargets; however, the effect of this
activity in the target matching units is to interfere with
representations of left or right ongoing responses, not to aid them.
An alternative explanation is that the intention superiority effect
reflects trials where top-down monitoring is absent or reduced,
leading to faster ongoing RTs than nontarget trials, a proportion
of which will be slowed by monitoring for PM targets [9]. Again,
this explanation cannot explain the model’s performance, seeing as
the monitoring unit was set to the same level on each time.
Although there was slight fluctuation of the monitoring unit’s
activation level on each cycle due to random noise, this had
a trivial effect on the model’s performance and the intention
superiority effect remained similar even when this noise was
removed. How else might the intention superiority effect be
explained? A clue comes from analysis of RT distributions, rather
than simply examining mean RT.
4. Response time distributions. An important character-
istic of the model is that noise is added to the activation level of
each unit on each cycle. This gives rise to variability from one trial
to the next, even when the stimulus is identical. We can therefore
plot the frequency distribution of ongoing, PM miss, and PM hit
RTs in Figure 4. Inspection of this figure suggests that these
distributions are positively skewed, as commonly observed for RTs
[23]. However, the right tail of the ongoing distribution seems
slightly overrepresented, compared with the PM miss distribution
(e.g. compare the small number of trials with RTs greater than 150
cycles in the ongoing distribution, versus the absence of such trials
in the PM miss distribution). What could explain the ‘‘missing’’
right tail of the PM miss distribution? We propose the following
explanation. As a result of random noise, on some trials the
ongoing pathway will be favoured, relative to the PM pathway; on
other trials the reverse will occur. Consider a trial on which noise
particularly slows down the build up of activation in the relevant
ongoing output unit. Of course, such trials will be associated with
relatively slow ongoing responses, seeing as it will take many cycles
until the activation level in the appropriate output unit reaches the
response threshold. These trials will therefore comprise the right
tail of the ongoing RT distribution. If a PM target has been
presented, it is quite likely that sufficient activation will have
accrued in the PM response unit to produce a PM response, before
sufficient activation in the (slowly accumulating) ongoing response
unit has accumulated for an ongoing response. This would
therefore be counted as a PM hit, and the trial would not be
included in the PM miss distribution. Conversely, those trials in
which activation builds up particularly quickly in the relevant
ongoing output unit will be likely to reach the response threshold
before sufficient activation has accumulated in the PM response
unit, and are therefore more likely to be included in the PM miss
distribution. In other words, those trials in which activation builds
up particularly quickly in the relevant ongoing response unit will
be likely to be included in both the ongoing and PM miss
distributions (i.e. when a nontarget and target stimulus are
presented, respectively). These trials will have relatively fast RTs.
However, those trials in which activation builds up slowly in the
relevant ongoing response unit (due to noise) will be likely to be
included in the ongoing distribution, but not the PM miss
Figure 3. Effects of stimulus degradation. Mean response time for PM miss, correct ongoing, and PM hit trials, alongside accuracy for ongoing
trials and PM hit rate. Results are shown separately for the model using its standard settings (blue bars) and degraded input settings (red bars).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059852.g003
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distribution (because they will be more likely to receive a PM hit).
Thus, simply due to the effect of noise on the likelihood of a PM
hit or miss, trials with slow RTs are unlikely to make it into the PM
miss distribution, leading to a difference in mean RT between
ongoing and PM miss trials. Of course, this explanation need not
rule out additional explanations of the intention superiority effect,
such as those discussed above. It does however suggest that an
intention superiority effect could arise simply due to the effect of
noise on competition between PM and ongoing response path-
ways.
One prediction of this account would be that a similar
difference in the spread of the RT distributions should be seen
when comparing ongoing trials with PM hits. On PM target trials
where (due to noise) the PM response unit builds up activation
quickly, a PM hit response is likely to be made. But on trials where
activation in the PM response unit builds up slowly, an erroneous
ongoing (i.e. PM miss) response is more likely to be produced.
Thus, instead of being included in the right tail of the PM hit
distribution, these trials may instead be included in the PM miss
distribution. We would therefore expect that the PM hit
distribution should have a less prominent right tail than the
ongoing distribution (where trials in which evidence accumulates
slowly will still, eventually, make it into the right tail of the
distribution). Inspection of the PM hit distribution in Figure 4
shows this to be the case.
In order to quantify the spread of the ongoing, PM miss, and
PM hit distributions, the coefficient of variation (CV) was
calculated. CV is defined as the ratio of standard deviation to
mean; it can therefore be considered to be a measure of variance,
controlling for differences in mean RT between conditions
[24;25]. Thus, proportional slowing of a RT distribution will lead
to an increase in mean RT but no change in CV. In the model’s
simulated RT distributions, CV was ordered ongoing .PM miss
.PM hit.
We carried out additional analyses of the intention superiority
effect in the model’s no-monitoring and high-monitoring settings.
In the high-monitoring setting, the intention superiority effect was
enhanced (9.8 cycles, or 18.2% of mean ongoing RT; standard
settings: 3.8 cycles, 7.5% of mean ongoing RT) whereas in the no-
monitoring setting the intention superiority effect was in fact
slightly reversed (20.8 cycles, 1.6% of mean ongoing RT). This
suggests that in the no-monitoring settings, when PM hits were
rare (3%), the additional response competition on PM target trials
may have slowed ongoing responses, whereas in the conditions
where PM hits were more common the effects described above
played a greater role in determining the intention superiority
effect. Evidence for response competition on PM target trials
comes from paradigms where previously-relevant target stimuli
cause slowing of RT on subsequent trials [26;27]. The simulations
therefore suggest that under some conditions the intention
superiority effect may not be obtained, and also that at least in
some circumstances (e.g. when variability in PM hit rates is
determined by monitoring levels) the size of the intention
superiority effect should increase when PM hits are more
common.
Experiment 1
We have now seen that the model reproduces several empirical
findings reported in the PM literature. It is able to perform the task
adequately. Ongoing RT slows when the model is monitoring for
PM targets, and the PM interference effect can be correlated with
PM detection rate in some circumstances but not others. The
model has also made two novel predictions. First, the model
predicts that PM hit rate might be decreased, and ongoing RT
increased, when stimuli are degraded. Second, the model predicts
that ongoing RT distributions should have a greater coefficient of
variation than either PM hit or PM miss distributions. We
therefore conducted an empirical study to test these predictions.
Methods
This research was approved by the UCL Division of Psychology
and Language Sciences ethics committee. All participants pro-
vided written informed consent before taking part. 26 participants
(17 female) took part in the study, in return for £5 or course credit.
Their mean age was 25 years (standard deviation: 6.5). Two
participants did not respond to any PM targets (making it unclear
whether they had understood the task instructions) and a third
made PM responses to fewer than 4% of targets, too few for an
analysis of PM hit RT distributions. These three participants were
excluded, alongside one further participant who fell asleep during
the experiment, leading to a final sample of 22 participants.
Participants were tested individually, sitting approximately
50 cm from a laptop computer in a quiet testing room. Example
stimuli are presented in Figure 5. Pairs of letters (A, B, or C, one
upper-case and one lower-case) were presented in white Arial font
(size 60) on a black background, with a fixation cross in the centre
of the screen. In half of the blocks, stimuli were degraded by
placing 85000 white pixels in randomly selected positions over
a 400 by 300-pixel rectangle in the centre of the display (i.e. 71%
of pixels in this rectangle). At the beginning of the experiment, the
ongoing task was described to participants and they performed two
blocks of 100 trials to familiarize themselves with the task (with
Figure 4. Response time distributions for the model’s simulation of correct ongoing, PMmiss, and PM hit trials. Coefficient of variation
(CV), i.e. standard deviation divided by mean, is also shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059852.g004
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standard stimuli). Participants made their responses using the
leftmost and rightmost of three adjacent keys on the keyboard.
The PM instructions were then explained: participants were
instructed to press the middle button if they noticed that the same
letter was presented on both sides of the screen. Without any
further practice, the experiment then began. Participants per-
formed 10 blocks of 100 trials, alternating between standard and
degraded stimuli for each block (with the stimuli for the first block
counterbalanced between participants). PM targets were presented
on a randomly selected 8% of trials. On each trial, the stimulus
was presented and remained on screen until a button was pressed.
The screen was then blanked for a variable delay (100–300 ms)
after which the next stimulus was presented.
Results and Discussion
The first trial of each block was excluded from the analysis.
Only correct ongoing trials are included in the analysis of ongoing
RTs (as in the model simulations above). Mean RTs and accuracy
levels (i.e. proportion correct for ongoing trials and proportion of
hits for PM target trials) are shown in Figure 6. RTs were analysed
in a 362 ANOVA with factors Trialtype (PM miss, ongoing, PM
hit) and Noise (noise, no-noise). There were significant main effects
of Trialtype (F(2,20) = 85, p,.001, g2p= .90) and Noise
(F(1,21) = 101, p,.001, g2p = .83), but no significant Trialtype x
Noise interaction (F(2,20) = 1.47, p = .25). Follow-up tests showed
that PM miss trials had significantly faster RTs than ongoing trials
(F(1,21) = 53, p,.001, g2p = .72), and PM hit trials had signifi-
cantly slower RTs than ongoing trials (F(1,21) = 90, p,.001,
g2p = .81). Furthermore, analysis of accuracy indicated that there
were fewer PM hits in the noise than the no-noise condition
(48.0% vs 52.4%; F(1,21) = 7.1, p = .01, g2p= .25). There was also
a trend towards higher ongoing accuracy in the noise than the no-
noise condition (97.8% vs. 97.5%; F(1, 21) = 3.9, p = .06,
g2p= .16). Analysis of individual differences in PM hit rates
showed that participants with higher hit rates also tended to have
a larger intention superiority effect (r = .62, p = .002). Thus, the
behavioural results were consistent with the following features of
the model’s performance: 1) slower RTs for noise than no-noise
conditions; 2) faster RT for PM miss than ongoing (i.e. intention
superiority effect); 3) slower RT for PM hit than ongoing; 4) lower
PM hit rate for noise than no-noise conditions; 5) greater intention
superiority effect associated with increased PM hit rate. We are not
proposing that degrading stimuli will always lead to a decrease in
PM target detection, across all event-related PM paradigms. For
example, in some situations, degrading stimuli might cause the
feature distinguishing targets versus nontargets to become more
salient. However, the present results indicate a situation where
a single manipulation can lead to both slowed ongoing RTs and
decreased PM target detection, consistent with the model’s
performance.
RT distributions. We next examined the model’s predic-
tions concerning RT distributions. Figure 7 illustrates the average
RT distribution for ongoing, PM miss, and PM hit trials. These
data were generated using Ratcliff’s [28] method for generating
group RT distributions, using 10 bins and collapsing over noise
and no-noise conditions to maximize power. As in the model’s
stimulations, the ongoing condition is least symmetrical of the
three, with a long right tail. Coefficient of variation (CV) was
calculated for the ongoing, PM miss, and PM hit distributions to
test the model’s prediction of greater CV for ongoing trials than
PM hit trials, with an intermediate CV for PM miss trials. The
same pattern was seen in the empirical data (Figure 7), albeit with
lower CV than the model across all conditions. CV was compared
between conditions using Wilcoxon signed rank tests (due to
significant deviation from the normal distribution). CV for
ongoing trials was significantly greater than for PM hit trials
(p,.001) and also PM miss trials (p = .0495). However, it should
be noted that by virtue of PM trials being relatively rare, ongoing
and PM trials had very different sample sizes. Seeing as CV may
be influenced by sample size, an unbiased estimate of CV for the
ongoing condition was calculated as follows. For each participant,
a random sample of trials from the ongoing condition was
obtained, equal to the number of PM hit trials. The CV for this
ongoing distribution, matched in sample size to the PM hit
distribution, was then calculated. This procedure was repeated
100,000 times to obtain a mean unbiased CV for the ongoing
condition. An analogous procedure was used to calculate an
unbiased ongoing CV for comparison against the PM miss
distribution. Again, in these analyses CV was significantly greater
for ongoing than PM hit trials (p,.001) and marginally
significantly greater for ongoing than PM miss trials (p = .077).
Thus, the model’s predictions were confirmed. Compared with
ongoing trials, CV was reduced on both PM hit trials (associated
with significantly slower mean RT) and PM miss trials (associated
with significantly faster mean RT). Finally, the unbiased analyses
were repeated, separately for the standard and degraded stimuli.
Figure 5. Schematic illustration of experimental stimuli in standard input and degraded input conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059852.g005
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With standard stimuli, the CV for ongoing trials (.24) was
significantly greater than the CV for PM hits (.18; p = .006) and
PM misses (.20; p= .016). With degraded stimuli, the CV for
ongoing trials (.24) was significantly greater than the CV for PM
hits (.17; p,.001). The comparison against the CV for PM misses
(.23) was not significant (p = .10), although the trend was in the
predicted direction.
Experiment 2
A central feature of the model’s architecture is competition
between the ongoing and PM input-output pathways so that on
each trial either an ongoing or a PM response is made, but not
both. The competitive interactions between these two pathways
underlie the model’s novel predictions concerning response time
distributions across different experimental conditions, as well as
phenomena such as the intention superiority effect. Experiment 1,
like many empirical studies of PM, also used a task in which
participants were instructed to make either an ongoing or PM
response on each trial, but not both. However, other studies have
used a task in which participants are instructed to make PM
responses in addition to ongoing responses on each trial, rather
than instead of them (see [29] for discussion). To simulate this
situation, the model would need to be modified. One simple way
of doing this would be to make the ongoing and PM input-output
pathways entirely separate, without lateral inhibition between
response units and separate response thresholds for the two types
of response. In this case, the model’s explanations of the intention
superiority effect and differential response time distributions
between ongoing, PM miss, and PM hit trials would no longer
apply. The purpose of this experiment was therefore to directly
compare these two experimental paradigms. After [29] we refer to
these as the ‘‘task switching’’ condition (where participants should
make an ongoing or a PM response, but not both) and the ‘‘dual
task’’ condition (where PM responses should be made in addition
to ongoing responses). We investigated whether these experimental
paradigms would modulate the following three effects that, in the
model, are dependent on competitive interactions between
ongoing and PM pathways: 1) intention superiority effect; 2)
greater CV of ongoing than PM miss RT distribution; 3) greater
CV of ongoing than PM hit RT distribution.
Figure 6. Empirical data.Mean response times are shown for PM miss, correct ongoing, and PM hit trials, alongside accuracy for ongoing trials and
PM hit rate. Results are shown separately for the standard stimulus condition (blue bars) and degraded stimulus condition (red bars). Error bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals for the within-subjects comparison between standard stimulus and degraded stimulus conditions, using Loftus and
Masson’s [49] method. See Fig. 3 for equivalent data from the model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059852.g006
Figure 7. Response time distributions for correct ongoing, PM miss, and PM hit trials. Distributions have been averaged over participants
using Ratcliff’s [28] method, with 10 bins. Coefficient of variation (CV), i.e. standard deviation divided by mean, is also shown. As in the model’s
simulations (Fig. 4), CV is greatest for ongoing trials, intermediate for PM miss trials, and least for PM hit trials.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059852.g007
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Methods
This research was approved by the UCL Division of Psychology
and Language Sciences ethics committee. All participants pro-
vided written informed consent before taking part. 44 participants
were recruited to take part in the study (26 female; mean age: 28,
SD: 8). Two participants failed to make any PM responses, making
it unclear whether they had understood task instructions, and one
participant performed at chance level (48%) on the ongoing task.
These three participants were excluded, along with an additional
participant whose data were excluded due to technical problems,
leaving a final sample of 40 participants. These participants were
divided randomly into equally-sized task switching and dual task
groups.
Participants were tested individually, sitting approximately
50 cm from a laptop computer in a quiet testing room. The task
and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with the following
exceptions. First, stimuli were never visually degraded in
Experiment 2. Second, stimuli were always presented for a fixed
duration of 650 ms, after which a blank screen was presented for
a random response-stimulus interval between 200–400 ms. Thus,
stimulus presentation was identical between the two participant
groups rather than being affected by responses produced on each
trial. Participants first performed 75 practice trials of the ongoing
task alone. The PM instructions were then explained. Participants
in the task switching group were instructed to make a PM response
instead of an ongoing response if they detected a target.
Participants in the dual task group were instructed to make an
ongoing response on every trial and to make an additional PM
response if they detected a target. They were told that they could
make the two responses in either order, but that they had to press
the PM button before the onset of the next trial. After a further 75
practice trials, participants performed 10 blocks of 225 experi-
mental trials.
Results
Table 1 shows a summary of results. In the dual task group, any
target trial in which the PM button was pressed was counted as
a PM hit. In the task switching group only the first button pressed
on each trial was considered in order to calculate PM accuracy.
Thus, the definition of a PM hit differed between the two groups in
accordance with the instructions that they were given. Results
from the task switching group conformed with the predictions
from the model. PM miss RTs were faster than ongoing RTs, i.e.
there was an intention superiority effect (F(1,19) = 41, p,.001,
g2p= .69). As in Experiment 1, Wilcoxon tests were used to
compare unbiased estimates of CV between the conditions.
Ongoing trials had significantly greater CV than both PM hits
(p,.001) and PM misses (p = .04). Thus, the task switching group
replicated the findings of Experiment 1, further confirming the
predictions of the model. However, if anything, the dual task
group showed a ‘‘intention inferiority effect’’, i.e. slower RTs for
PM miss than ongoing trials (F(1,19) = 3.5, p = .08, g2p= .16). One
participant in the dual task group showed an ‘‘intention inferiority
effect’’ of 220 ms, more than 8 standard deviations from the rest of
the group, and was therefore excluded as an outlier in this analysis.
Even with this participant included in the analysis, the RT
difference between ongoing and PM miss trials was still not
significant (p = .08). Direct comparison indicated a significant
difference between the intention superiority effects of the two
groups (F(1,38) = 9.7, p = .004, g2p= .21). This difference between
the groups is illustrated in Figure 8. Furthermore, in the dual task
group the CV findings were reversed: ongoing CV was signifi-
cantly lower than both PM hit CV (p= .001) and PM miss CV
(p= .01). Mann-Whitney U tests showed a significant difference
between the two groups in both CV differences (p,.002). Thus,
although the performance of the task switching group was similar
to the performance of the model (which implements a task
switching version of the task), participants performing a non-
competitive version of the task did not perform in the manner
predicted by the model. Analysis of individual differences in PM
hit rates showed that the intention superiority effect was not
significantly correlated with the hit rate in either group (task
switching: r = .11, p= .64; dual task: r =2.23, p= .35). Compar-
ison of these correlation coefficients with Experiment 1 showed
that this correlation was significantly lower than the previous
experiment in the dual task group (p = .004) and marginally-
significantly so in the task switching group (p= .07).
Discussion
This experiment arose from the consideration that our model
depends on competition between the ongoing and PM pathways in
order to produce three effects: 1) intention superiority effect; 2)
greater CV of ongoing than PM miss RT distribution; 3) greater
CV of ongoing than PM hit RT distribution. If these phenomena
were to be found regardless of whether the task was performed in
a competitive or noncompetitive manner, this would cast doubt on
the generalizability of the model’s predictions. However, we found
that the intention superiority effect was eliminated and the CV
effects were reversed when participants performed a noncompet-
itive version of the task. This provides further evidence for the
importance of competition for the findings simulated by the
model. As discussed in the Introduction, it is likely that some of the
phenomena reported in the PM literature (e.g. intention superi-
ority effect, intention maintenance cost) result from multiple
causes, only some of which are simulated in the model. We
therefore do not propose that these phenomena should only ever
be seen in situations simulated by the model. However, the finding
that the three phenomena investigated in this experiment were
either abolished or reversed in conditions dissimilar to those
simulated by the model lends further support to its utility in
understanding at least some of the origins of empirical phenomena
reported in the PM literature. These findings also underline the
Table 1. Results of Experiment 2, presented separately for
the task switching and dual task groups, along with statistical




PM hit rate 31% 71% t(38) = 7.8, p,.001
PM hit RT 601 msec 690 msec t(38) = 5.2, p,.001
PM hit CV 0.13 0.29 Mann-Whitney U test, p,.001
PM false alarm
rate
0.47% 0.99% t(38) = 2.2, p = .03
Ongoing RT 460 msec 432 msec t(38) = 1.5, p = .15
Ongoing accuracy 93% 91% t(38) = 1.1, p = .30
Ongoing CV 0.18 0.19 Mann-Whitney U test, p = .50
PM miss RT 445 msec 454 msec t(38) = 0.4, p = .72
PM miss CV 0.17 0.23 Mann-Whitney U, p = .003
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059852.t001
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importance of considering the generalizability of phenomena
across diverse empirical approaches for the study of PM.
Unlike Experiment 1, the intention superiority effect was not
correlated with the PM hit rate in either group in this experiment.
This is perhaps surprising, at least in the task switching group.
How might this discrepancy be explained? One possibility is that
this result simply reflects noise, seeing as the direct comparison
between Experiment 1 and the task switching group was only
marginally significant. However, an alternative account might be
as follows. In Experiment 1, the stimulus on each trial remained on
the screen until the response was made. Thus participants could
choose to delay their ongoing response as long as they liked if they
wanted to ensure that they did not miss PM targets. In this case,
considerable variance in PM hit rates might be explained by
individual differences in PM monitoring, associated with perceived
priority of PM versus ongoing task demands or the conscientious-
ness with which participants performed the task. The simulations
above showed that manipulating PM hit rates by adjusting the
monitoring level led to a correlation between PM hit rates and the
intention superiority effect. However, in Experiment 2, stimuli
were presented for a fixed period of 650 msec, so that stimulus
presentation times could be equalized between the two groups and
in order to avoid ceiling effects in PM performance. Correspond-
ingly, ongoing RTs were considerably shorter in this experiment,
and PM hit rates were lower in the task switching group
(comparable to the instructions for Experiment 1). Thus, in the
present experiment, relatively little variance in PM hit rates might
be explained by individual differences in PM monitoring, seeing as
participants could not choose to delay their ongoing responses
indefinitely in order to ensure accurate PM responding. In this
experiment, variance in PM hit rates might be more readily
explained in terms of intrinsic capacity limitations, which might
not be expected to correlate with the intention superiority effect.
This interpretation might underlie the difference between Exper-
iment 1 and Experiment 2, although in the absence of direct
empirical evidence it remains a speculative suggestion at present.
Simulation of Intention Encoding
The simulations considered above involve a model whereby the
identity of target stimuli (i.e. repeated letters) is hard-coded into
the connection weights. In this section, we consider how this model
might be extended to simulate a situation in which the identity of
PM targets can be dynamically updated, i.e. where the model can
encode the identity of new target stimuli from one trial to the next.
The situation we consider is similar to the paradigm investigated in
an fMRI study reported by Gilbert et al. [30]. In this study,
participants viewed a series of stimuli as part of an ongoing task,
some of which were surrounded by a coloured border. When this
occurred, participants memorized the stimulus so that they could
make a PM response if they encountered that stimulus on
a subsequent trial, rather than perform the ongoing task (see [31]
for a related approach). Gilbert et al. [30] investigated the
correlation between patterns of brain activity on the trial when
a cue was encoded versus the trial when it was repeated (i.e. PM
target trial). They found that this correlation was higher for PM
hits than PM misses. In other words, successful PM performance
was associated with enhanced correlation between encoding- and
retrieval-related brain activity. Here, we investigate whether
a model that incorporates both PM encoding and PM detection
produces a similar pattern of results.
For this simulation, we only considered a single PM target
stimulus, rather than the multiple PM target stimuli in the earlier
Figure 8. Mean response times for ongoing and PM miss trials in the two groups. The task switching group shows a significant intention
superiority effect (i.e. faster responses for PM miss than ongoing trials) but there is no significant difference in the dual task group. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals for the within-subjects comparison between the two conditions for each group, using Loftus and Masson’s [49] method.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059852.g008
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simulations (‘‘A a’’, ‘‘B B’’, etc.). Thus we removed two of the
target detection units so that there was only a single target
detector. Furthermore we removed the hard-wired connections
from stimulus input units to the target detecting unit. Apart from
this, the architecture and connection weights of the model were
left unchanged. In order to encode a PM target, a stimulus was
presented at the stimulus input units (i.e. two units had their
activation levels set to 1). Furthermore, noise was applied to each
stimulus input unit to simulate variability between perceptual
processing and contextual factors from one trial to the next. This
was achieved by adding a random number drawn from a Gaussian
distribution (mean: 0, standard deviation: 0.15) to each stimulus
input unit. Note that activation of the stimulus input units could
just as well represent internal simulation of a target stimulus (e.g.
visual imagery of that stimulus, which is known to yield patterns of
brain activity in low-level visual cortex akin to actually viewing
a particular stimulus) rather than perception of that stimulus (see
[30], p. 103, for further discussion of this point). The target
detector unit also had its activation level set to 1. Following this,
Hebbian learning was applied between each of the stimulus input
units and the target detection unit, i.e. the connection weight from
each stimulus input unit to the target detection unit was set to the
product of the two activation levels (seeing as this product was not
scaled, this corresponds to a learning rate of 1). The model was
then run as before, with 100 repetitions of each possible stimulus
apart from the PM target, which was presented an equivalent
number of times as all of the other stimuli summed together.
During this testing phase, the stimulus input units selected on each
trial had random noise added in the same manner as the encoding
phase, to simulate variability in perceptual processing and
contextual factors. This procedure was repeated 1000 times, with
a randomly selected target stimulus each time, in order to assess
the model’s performance. In order to assess encoding-retrieval
similarity of representations, the correlation coefficient was
obtained between activation levels of the stimulus input units on
each stimulus encoding trial and its associated target trials.
Three features of the model’s behaviour are of note. First, the
model performs the task adequately (PM hit rate: 62%; PM false
alarm rate: 0.7%; ongoing accuracy: 99%). Second, the model
continues to simulate the intention superiority effect (ongoing RT:
54.0 cycles; PM miss RT: 47.2 cycles), and also the CV for
ongoing trials (0.55) was greater than the CV for PM hits (0.39) or
PM misses (0.45). Thus, the model consistently simulates the
phenomena described in the earlier simulations. Third, as in the
fMRI data reported by Gilbert et al. [30] the similarity (i.e.
correlation coefficient) between encoding-related and target-re-
lated patterns of activation was higher for PM hits than PM misses
(hits: r = .887; miss: r = .869). The computational explanation for
this is straightforward: as a simple byproduct of the Hebbian
learning algorithm, the closer the match between the original
presentation of a stimulus and its subsequent presentations, the
greater the activation sent to the PM response node. Thus the
present modelling framework suggests a simple manner in which
the encoding of PM targets could be simulated, and as a natural
consequence of this approach it reproduces an effect observed in
a neuroimaging investigation of PM. This mirrors a behavioural
effect whereby PM performance is boosted when the PM target
episode matches the encoding episode more closely, including
contextual factors such as the typeface in which items are
presented or the room in which participants are seated [32;33;34].
The simulation above describes a simple method whereby the
model can activate a new intention. But what about deactivating
intentions? In order to investigate this, an additional simulation
was conducted whereby instead of zeroing the connection weights
after an intention was no longer relevant, the monitoring level was
set to zero and a post-PM block was run. This simulates the
persistence of a prior memory trace, even when it is no longer
relevant to the task. All other features of the model’s operation
were left unchanged. In this simulation, PM ‘‘hits’’ (i.e. errors of
commission) occurred on 9.4% of trials (versus a false alarm rate to
nontarget items of 0.1%). Ongoing RTs to previous targets were
slower (55.8 cycles) than non-target stimuli (53.1 cycles). When
connection weights between stimulus input units and the target
detection unit were additionally reduced by 50% in the post-PM
block, to simulate a decay of the representations of previous
targets, this strongly reduced the likelihood of errors of commission
(0.2% of trials, versus 0.05% false alarm rate). Nevertheless, RTs
to previous targets remained slower (54.7 cycles) than non-target
stimuli (53.0 cycles). Thus response competition, caused by
associative links that were not strong enough to reliably yield
PM responses, nevertheless slowed RTs. This simulates the pattern
of results seen in recent studies of intention deactivation, where
previous targets slow ongoing responses, in the context of
occasional errors of commission [27;35]. Note that this slowing
could also be considered an ‘‘intention inferiority effect’’, under-
lining the importance of the model’s ability to simulate both
speeded PM miss RTs (versus ongoing RTs) and slowed PM miss
RTs in different circumstances.
General Discussion
In this article we have presented a computational model of
event-based PM with the following core features: 1) competing,
interactive pathways governing ongoing and PM responding; 2)
two mechanisms underlying PM responding: direct triggering of
PM responses by spreading activation from input representations,
and assistance from a top-down control mechanism; 3) a graded
continuum between controlled top-down monitoring for PM
targets versus pure bottom-up triggering, rather than an all-or-
nothing mechanism. The model fits a wide body of empirical
results: slowing of ongoing responses and increased PM accuracy
as a result of top-down monitoring for PM targets; correlation
between ongoing RT and PM accuracy in some circumstances but
not others; and the intention superiority effect (i.e. faster PM miss
than ongoing RT). The model also made novel predictions that
were confirmed in two empirical studies. PM accuracy was
reduced (and ongoing RT increased) when visual stimuli were
degraded. Furthermore, the model predicted that ongoing trials
should differ from PM miss and PM hit trials in the shape of RT
distributions; analogous effects were found in the empirical data.
Finally, the model predicted that these RT distribution effects and
the intention superiority effect should be modulated by the use of
experimental paradigms in which PM responses either accompany
or replace ongoing responses. This prediction was also confirmed
empirically.
Of course, the model does not provide an account of all
empirical phenomena that have been reported in the PM
literature; nor, for those phenomena it does simulate, does it
necessarily provide an exhaustive account. In particular, the
simulations reported above rely heavily on competitive interac-
tions between ongoing and PM pathways. Yet some of the
phenomena simulated by the model, including the intention
superiority effect and the intention maintenance cost, have been
reported in noncompetitive situations where PM responses
accompany rather than replace ongoing responses [3;6]. This
suggests that the model simulates a subset of the cognitive
processes contributing to PM performance, and that extra
principles must also be considered to account for PM performance
Prospective Memory
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 11 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e59852
across all experimental paradigms. We have already considered in
the Introduction some of the alternative, non-exclusive accounts
that have been considered for the intention superiority effect. We
also note that a variety of different paradigms have been used to
investigate the intention superiority effect, often involving memory
for script based activities (e.g. [7]) which may involve rather
different mechanisms. Regarding the intention maintenance cost,
other phenomena that might be considered are response-threshold
shifts [36] and additional performance costs associated with
monitoring/checking the environment for PM cues that need not
apply on ongoing-only trials [3;37], alongside the model’s
simulation of greater response competition engendered by PM
conditions. Furthermore, PM targets were presented relatively
frequently (8% of trials) in the empirical work presented here. It is
unclear how well the model’s predictions would generalize to
paradigms with less frequent target presentation. The present work
suggests that processes underlying PM performance can be
multifaceted, depending on the precise nature of the experimental
task. One corollary of this conclusion is that different processes
might well account for identical patterns (e.g. intention superiority
effect) across different PM tasks.
It should also be noted that in the present work the model
parameters were set by hand, and we have not attempted to
systematically explore the parameter space. It is therefore possible
that the model might produce alternative patterns of behaviour if
different parameter settings were used. Seeing as there are multiple
free parameters in the model, it is a complex question how to set
upper and lower bounds for those parameters and then explore the
multi-dimensional parameter space in a computationally tractable
manner (see [38] for discussion). Here, rather than attempting
such an enterprise, we have taken the approach of validating the
model via the generation and verification of novel predictions,
along with showing that it can reproduce previously-reported
patterns of results.
Although these considerations make it clear that the model does
not provide an exhaustive account of phenomena associated with
PM, Experiment 2 showed that some of these phenomena were
significantly modulated by subtle changes in the experimental
paradigm used for assessing PM, as predicted by the model. This
underlines the importance of explicit computational accounts that
can help to link specific experimental paradigms to underlying
principles. Given the clear differences between the task switching
and dual task groups tested in Experiment 2, it seems unlikely that
a single computational explanation will account for behavioural
data across all of the diverse experimental paradigms that have
been used to test PM. However, the successful novel predictions
made by the model demonstrate its utility for understanding
underlying processes involved in at least some PM paradigms. It is
an interesting question how far everyday PM situations should be
considered in terms of the task switching versus dual task
operationalizations examined in Experiment 2. While in many
everyday PM tasks the intended behaviour can be produced in
addition to ongoing activities, other situations require the intended
behaviour to replace the ongoing activity. These situations include
any circumstance in which the intended and ongoing behaviours
are mutually incompatible, for example stopping at a shop to buy
milk on the way home, instead of continuing one’s journey.
The finding in the model and in participants performing
a competitive version of the task that PM hit trials had a lower
coefficient of variation (CV) than ongoing trials is of particular
theoretical interest. Previous studies have suggested that conditions
involving executive function, or controlled processing, lead to an
increase in CV, relative to conditions involving more automatic
processing. For example, Segalowitz and Segalowitz [24] showed
that both RT and CV increased in a second-language lexical
decision task for participants with relatively little practice.
Additionally, Segalowitz et al. [25] showed, in a task switching
paradigm [39], that trials following a switch of task had slower
RTs and increased CV. By contrast, at least in the competitive
version of the task, PM hit trials (which may be thought to involve
control processes such as inhibition of the ongoing response, and
monitoring for target events) had slower RTs but reduced CV, in
comparison with ongoing trials. Thus, competitive PM paradigms
seem to constitute an exception to the rule that tasks involving
relatively controlled processing lead to increased CV. This can be
explained by the hypothesis that on those trials where participants
have difficulty producing a PM response (e.g. due to noise), instead
of producing a very slow response, they may actually produce a PM
miss response instead. Such trials will therefore not be included as
a PM hit, leading to a narrowing of the PM hit distribution.
Consistent with this explanation, PM hit trials had increased CV,
relative to ongoing trials, in the dual task condition.
Comparison with Theoretical Accounts of PM
We believe that the present model corresponds most readily
with the multiprocess framework put forward by McDaniel and
Einstein [13]. Consistent with this account, PM responses in the
model can arise either from direct environmental triggering, or as
a result of the influence from top-down monitoring. Even when
this top-down monitoring system was switched off (i.e. set to zero),
the model still made accurate PM responses on a small proportion
of trials. Thus, bottom-up triggering was sufficient to enable PM
responding on at least some trials, consistent with Scullin et al.’s
[11] suggestion that certain circumstances can permit appropriate
PM responding in the absence of strategic monitoring.
One of the ways in which the model is currently somewhat
limited is in the use of localist stimulus representations, with each
unit representing both the identity and the location of a stimulus.
A more sophisticated model might make use of distributed
representations of different stimulus features. In this case,
attentional biases towards stimulus features that are relevant for
the ongoing task might have the effect of reducing activation
related to features that are irrelevant to the ongoing task. This
might help to capture the contrast between bottom-up triggering
of PM responses by ‘focal’ versus ‘non-focal’ PM cues [13], where
the feature that defines PM targets either overlaps or fails to
overlap with an ongoing-task-relevant stimulus feature.
In contrast with the multiprocess framework, Smith [3] has
argued that strategic monitoring is always required for PM
responding. This framework has been elaborated in a multinomial
mathematical model by Smith & Bayen [20] (see also [36;40;41]).
It should be noted that the present modelling framework might be
consistent with the hypothesis that PM always requires strategic
monitoring, if different parameter settings were adopted. For
example, if the connection strengths from the target monitoring
unit to the PM response unit were weakened, the model might
never be able to make a PM response purely on the basis of
bottom-up triggering, and would therefore require top-down
control from the monitoring unit. However, we see the model as
differing from the framework presented by Smith and Bayen [20]
in two fundamental respects. First, in the present model, top-down
control is graded along a continuum. By contrast, in Smith and
Bayen’s model, top-down control is either engaged or not, in
a binary stochastic manner. Second, Smith and Bayen’s model
implements a two-stage process: on each trial, the model either is
monitoring for a PM target or not. If it is monitoring and a PM
target is presented, a PM response will always be made (subject to
accurate retrospective memory for the target identity); otherwise
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a PM response will never be made. There is therefore no direct
interaction between PM and ongoing pathways; the model’s
preparedness for an ongoing response has no influence on PM
performance. However, in the present model, interactive compe-
tition between the PM and ongoing pathways plays a fundamental
role in its simulation of the intention superiority effect, and the
differing RT distributions between ongoing and PM conditions. In
the absence of interactive competition between ongoing and PM
response pathways, it is difficult to see how the distinction between
RT distributions on ongoing and PM trials could be simulated. We
therefore suggest that Smith and Bayen’s model can play a helpful
role in simulating certain patterns of behaviour, but does not
capture phenomena resulting from interactive competition
between processing related to ongoing and PM task demands.
Relationship with Brain Mechanisms Underlying PM
While it may be oversimplistic to identify individual elements of
the model with specific brain regions, we wish to point out one
potential relationship between the present modelling results and
data from neuroimaging. One feature of the monitoring unit in
our model is that it is connected equally to all units representing
potential PM targets. It might therefore be considered to play
a ‘‘content-free’’ role in PM, in the sense that the monitoring unit
itself does not represent any specific PM target stimulus, or
a specific PM response. These elements are represented elsewhere
in the model. The role of the monitoring unit is simply to up-
regulate all processing related to PM, without requiring any
detailed representation of potential PM targets or responses. This
content-free role may be compared with the role of rostrolateral
prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) suggested in a functional MRI study by
Gilbert [42]. Previous neuroimaging investigations of PM have
consistently reported increased activation in RLPFC, correspond-
ing to lateral aspects of Brodmann Area 10, when participants
anticipate and/or encounter PM targets [43;44;45;46]. Gilbert
[42] showed, in a modified PM paradigm, that the content of
delayed intentions could be decoded from patterns of brain activity
in medial frontal and posterior brain regions. However, although
RLPFC showed strong activity while participants maintained
delayed intentions, the content of those intentions could not be
decoded from RLPFC itself. Furthermore, RLPFC increased its
functional coupling with intention-representing brain regions
while intentions were stored. In this respect, the role of RLPFC
in PM might be considered to be analogous to the monitoring unit
in the present study: interacting with representations stored
elsewhere, so that appropriate targets may be detected and
responses produced, rather than itself representing specific PM
cues and responses.
The finding in Gilbert [42] that functional coupling between
RLPFC and intention-representing brain regions was increased
during intention storage would be trivially simple to simulate in the
present modelling framework. If activation of the monitoring unit
were to fluctuate over time during intention storage (cf. [9]), this
would lead to a correlation between activation in the monitoring
unit and the target detection units to which it is directly connected.
By contrast there would be no correlation between activation in
the monitoring unit and target detection units if the monitoring
level were set to zero.
The present simulations also captured an additional phenom-
enon consistent with neuroimaging data, namely a greater
correlation between encoding- and retrieval-related activity for
hits than misses [30]. Note that in both the empirical and the
computational data a similar analysis was conducted: calculation
of the correlation coefficient between two vectors of activation
levels, with each vector representing a specific trial or condition.
This approach, in the context of neuroimaging, has previously
been referred to as ‘representational similarity analysis’ [47].
However, the same technique is just as applicable to the type of
model investigated here: a similar conclusion is drawn regardless
of whether the analysis is conducted over a vector of parameter
estimates across a set of voxels [30] or across a vector of activation
levels across a set of processing units (present simulations).
Connectionist computational models can be difficult to connect
with results from neuroimaging, seeing as such models do not
always make anatomical predictions suitable for testing with such
techniques [48]. However, representational similarity analysis
provides an approach that allows us to bring together behaviour,
computational modelling, and functional neuroimaging within
a single framework.
Conclusions
The present results lend support to the hypothesis that event-
based PM depends on the interplay between bottom-up triggering
of appropriate responses by environmental cues, and top-down
monitoring. The results also suggest that an important de-
terminant of behaviour in at least some PM paradigms may be
interactive competition between processing pathways supporting
ongoing versus PM responses. We hope that this relatively simple
modelling framework may serve as a bridge to link cognitive-level
theories of the processes underlying PM with neuroscientific
investigations of its underlying brain mechanisms.
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